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Various areas of international law highlight the value of information and the essential
role of the obligation to notify in fulfilling other duties. The current COVID-19 global
crisis has further stressed the significance of notification requirements, given
the hypothesized possibility that the pandemic could have been averted had the
obligation to notify been fulfilled. Through International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) cases
that analyze this obligation, mainly relative to the customary duty to prevent or
not to cause transboundary harm, I discuss the legal consequences of its breach,
broadly scrutinize the use of litigation in enforcing such obligation, and posit that
instead of adjudication, a more suitable approach to ensuring compliance consists of
international organizations facilitating cooperation among States and other non-State
actors.
Demanding accountability for the pandemic
Some writers blame China for the pandemic, alleging that its lack of transparency
and delay in notifying the World Health Organization (“WHO”) about events in
Wuhan prevented WHO and Member States from timely addressing what eventually
became a public health emergency of international concern. Per the general case
theory, belated notification and/or omission of critical information constitute a breach
of the obligation to notify under Article 6 of the International Health Regulations
(“IHR” or “Regulations”) (2005). This breach obliges China to repair the harms,
specifically economic losses and moral hardships, being experienced by people
across the globe. I neither advance any side nor speculate on the merits of the
potential case. Instead, I ask whether it is worthwhile for injured States to sue China
before the ICJ. Assuming jurisdictional basis can be established, and China is
found to have violated the IHR (2005) notification requirements, the trillion-dollar
question that matters for those seeking monetary payoffs, is, can injured States
obtain compensation through the suit? What is the pecuniary value of a violation
of the obligation to notify? To answer these questions, I examine the outcomes of
disputes concerning a breach of such obligation and identify potential issues that
diminish the probability of financial returns.
Monetizing breach
The International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Articles on the Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“ARSIWA”) support the hypothetical plaintiffs’
theory. ARSIWA, Article 31 provides for the obligation to make full reparation for
injury – defined as including “any damage, whether material or moral” – caused by
an internationally wrongful act. To emphasize, “reparation” is the generic term for a
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range of measures to address or correct the breach of an international obligation.
“Compensation”, in the sense of “financially assessable damage including loss of
profits”, is only one of the different forms that reparation can take [ARSIWA, Article
36]. The assessment of compensation can include replacement or repair costs
of destroyed or damaged property and “incidental damage arising … out of the
need to pay pensions and medical expenses for officials injured as the result of a
wrongful act” [ILC Commentary to ARSIWA]. Remarkably, in only one of three cases
has the ICJ required a State to pay compensation for breach of its obligation to
notify. In others, reparation took the form of “satisfaction”, which “may consist in an
acknowledgment of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another
appropriate modality” [ARSIWA, Article 37].
Breach-injury causation
To obtain compensation, sufficient causal link between the failure to notify and
the injuries to persons or property is critical. In the   (concerning interrelated
due diligence and environmental protection duties), because harms (to the river
ecosystem and the riparian States’ economies) arising from the lack of notification
were not established, the Court deemed its finding/declaration of breach as
appropriate satisfaction. It concurrently rejected claims for compensation and
restitution or restoration of the status quo ante. Pulp Mills can nonetheless be read
as suggesting that, because procedural obligations have a separate existence, they
can be independently breached and thereby engage State responsibility. The duty
to compensate, however, is contingent on the demonstration of a violation-injury
causation. Relatedly, following the Seabed Disputes Chamber Advisory Opinion (on
States’ responsibilities under the Law of the Sea Convention relative to sponsored
activities in the Area), evidence of breach of a procedural obligation, e.g. notification
requirement, can be instrumental in proving noncompliance with due diligence duties
to prevent significant transboundary harm. If it can be shown that China’s  purported
concealment of pertinent information or belated response to the imminent outbreak
within its territory necessitated the restrictive measures presently causing adverse
socioeconomic effects, then one can plausibly argue that its failure to notify triggered
the obligation to pay compensation.
Information-sharing as requisite and expression of cooperation
In the LaGrand case, the ICJ adjudged a commitment (to implement measures
ensuring future compliance with related treaty obligations) as adequate reparation,
meeting the injured State’s request for general assurance of non-repetition. The
internationally wrongful omission (to inform the accused of their entitlement to
consular assistance) in LaGrand is substantially different from the supposed non-
disclosure relative to COVID-19. However, the Court’s explanation about the
consular notification obligation being part of the initial phase of “an interrelated
regime designed to [implement] the system of consular protection” is applicable by
analogy to the IHR (2005). The required notification under Article 6 is “the starting
point for a dialogue between WHO and the notifying State Party on further event
assessment, potential investigation and any appropriate public health response
measures” [WHO Guidance for the Use of Annex 2]. In this international legal
framework, which operates on the principle of informational cooperation, WHO
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serves as a “central component in the fulfilment of [States’] obligation to co-operate”
– similar to the Commission’s role in Pulp Mills, wherein the duty to inform is the first
step to realizing States’ shared objectives. The obligation to notify is essential to
international cooperation, because it is the information relayed by the knowledgeable
State that enables other States, often through an international organization, to
collectively evaluate a given situation and coordinate their actions.
Proving knowledge and its consequences
More promising for those seeking indemnification is the Corfu Channel case, wherein
the State was held liable to compensate the damage to persons and property
resulting from explosions within its territorial waters, because it failed to warn
other States about the risky situation in that area under its exclusive control. Corfu
Channel also offers important insights on evidentiary matters, i.e. the circumstances
under which a State is presumed to know certain facts, and what the implications are
upon establishing such knowledge. First, exclusive territorial control broadens “the
methods of proof available to establish [a State’s] knowledge,” meaning, the plaintiff
“should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of facts and circumstantial
evidence,” given the difficulty of establishing a negative fact (omission) and its
effects. Second, possession per se of knowledge about potential harms creates an
obligation to notify others of such risk. Failure to share this information generates
international responsibility for loss and damage caused by the risky situation, which
a State had prior knowledge of. The foregoing lessons would help in judicially
demanding compensation for injuries incurred due to the pandemic.
Conclusion
Lawsuits necessarily involve a calculated risk, since they can trigger political and
economic backlash, including international trade and travel restrictions, which
the Regulations seek to avoid in the first place. Given the scant precedent for
successfully obtaining compensation, it makes little economic sense to litigate before
the ICJ a failure to notify. Building a case and gathering evidence would require
injured States to use considerable material and technical resources, which might
be better spent on economic recovery and social protection efforts. The disastrous
impacts of omitting valuable information thus compel a search for alternative means
to enforce the obligation to notify.
Rules-based dispute settlement systems – as what developed in the trade
and investment regimes – depoliticize the implementation of international legal
obligations. Without discounting the importance of these systems, I submit
that instead of an adversarial approach, global health governance requires an
international organization with reinforced independence, expertise, and credibility
and more clearly-delineated functions that include serving as an “information
clearinghouse”, i.e. facilitating international cooperation, which necessitates, and
is manifested through, information-sharing among States and non-State actors.
The Regulations’ silence about the legal consequences of violating its provisions
seemingly presumes that institutional mechanisms would adequately address
compliance issues. The COVID-19 global crisis, however, reveals that WHO has
limited recourse against uncooperative, non-transparent States. Reforms, such as
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hardening the WHO’s “soft” emergency powers and emphasizing the significance of
the legal duty to cooperate, are thus imperative. Closer public scrutiny, particularly
through the monitoring role of civil society, both at the global and domestic levels,
should also be promoted. Indeed, the WHO’s database comprises not only
information collected on its own and those relayed by States, but reports from other
international organizations [Art. 14] and concerned non-State actors [Art. 9] as well.
The IHR (2005) imposes legal obligations on both WHO and the Member States.
Problematically, WHO’s performance of its obligations remains quite dependent on
information that States provide. Although the Organization can arguably enforce
the States’ obligation to notify by acquiring the pertinent information itself, it cannot
singlehandedly achieve the ultimate goal of preventing pandemics. Such objective
further entails recognition of interdependence, solidarity, and collective action, with
each Member State implementing health measures/responses based on the most
complete, accurate, and updated information generated, consolidated, verified, and
made available by WHO. Information-sharing is a vital but not the sole component
of the international regulatory regime for health. Therefore, the decision whether or
not to sue for breach of notification requirements has to also consider those other
components that require an enduring relationship, which might be disrupted by
litigation.
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